TTR Dealmaker Q&A – Carlos Chávez (Galicia Abogados)

TTR Dealmaker Q&A

March, 2015

AT&T acquires Iusacell from Grupo Salinas

USD 2.5bn

Carlos Chávez
Galicia Abogados

A team led by Manuel Galicia, José Visoso, and Carlos Chávez , Partners at Mexico City-based Galicia Abogados, advised AT&T on its acquisition of Mexico-based Iusacell from Grupo Salinas. The deal closed on 16 January, 2015. This was the first mobile carrier acquisition resulting from the new 2014 Telecommunications and Broadcasting Act, designed to bring greater competition to the market. The Telecoms Act of 2014 came on the heels of initial constitutional changes signed into law by President Enrique Peña Nieto in mid-2013.
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Q: At what stage in the negotiations was Galicia retained?

A: We were retained in the early stages of the process. We were referred by AT&T’s US counsel, Sullivan & Cromwell, a firm we’ve worked closely with on a number of complex M&A transactions. We were selected for our M&A experience and for our strength in antitrust law. Our strength in telecom regulation also contributed to Sullivan’s recommendation. From management presentations to the deal close it only took four months. We had at least 15 fee earners involved, including six partners and we feel it was a good demonstration of our capacity to navigate complex regulatory terrain in a highly dynamic market.

Q: What market conditions set the stage for this transaction?

A: The Mexican mobile market is dominated by America Movil’s Telcel. Telefonica’s Movistar and Nextel are the other mobile carriers. What changed under the telecom reform law? It introduced the concepts of preponderance and asymmetric regulation, which requires the preponderant agent to share certain infrastructure and limits its ability to charge termination fees to other carriers and enter into exclusive dealing arrangements, among others. Together, these measures are designed to create a more competitive landscape and limit the power of the preponderant player.

Q: Why did it take so long for Mexico to legislate for greater competition?

A: The Telecom reform was one of the promises of the new Peña Nieto administration, along with certain tax, political and energy reforms. Many concepts in the new telecom act had been discussed since 2006, but did not become law as a consenus was not reached at the time. Telecommunications are a fundamental part of the development of an economy and Mexico is no exception. Market conditions at the time of the reform featured dominant players and no strong competitors. The will, the consensus to do something about it, finally allowed the 2013 amendments and the 2014 enactment of the Telecoms law.

 

“One thing that had an immediate impact was the elimination of restrictions on foreign investment in the sector”

Two new regulatory bodies were created, the Federal Telecommunications Institute (IFT) and the Federal Economic Competition Commission (COFECE), while the previous telecoms regulator, the Federal Telecommunications Commission (COFETEL), was dismantled. The result is a clear demarcation between general market-oriented regulation aimed at promoting competition and efficiency across all economic sectors in the case of COFECE, and oversight specific to the telecom and broadcasting industry by the IFT.


Q: How is the 50% market share threshold defining a dominant player measured?

A: This is part of what was left somehow open in the amendments. The 50% threshold is assessed on a national basis in the telecoms or broadcast services, based on number of users, subscribers, audience or on-network traffic. The position of the regulator has been that if an economic agent controls 50% or more of the entire market, using data from the main services comprising this market, such agent is a preponderant agent within the meaning of the constitutional amendments and the Telecoms Act.

Q: How was your client able to take advantage of the telecom reforms in this transaction?

A: While the main aspects of the reforms are yet to be applied, this transaction benefited from the changes relating to the new telecom regulator, IFT, and its jurisdiction. IFT is now a one-stop regulator with powers to review and clear a transaction like this, both from a regulatory and a competition perspective. We were able to file for clearance and obtain the same in an expeditious fashion, benefiting from the new rules in the Telecoms Act.

“IFT is now a one-stop regulator with powers to review and clear a transaction like this, both from a regulatory and a competition perspective”

Q: What antitrust considerations came into play in this transaction and how were these issues resolved?

A: We believe that the deal was seen favorably given everything established in the new law. One thing that the regulator did address was the historical relationship between Telcel and AT&T, which had been a minority shareholder of the Mexican company. The regulator made clear that there should be no ties between the two companies going forward. On the other hand, Totalplay Telecomunicaciones, a triple play subsidiary of Iusacell, had to be separated from the entities that AT&T acquired. IFT reviewed this separation prior to the closing and was satisfied with the result.

Q: What does AT&T’s acquisition imply for Mexico’s telecom market?

A: It’s a great prospect for the mobile market specifically to have a global competitor with a significant presence and an impeccable track record as a world-class operator.

Q: What other transactions could result from the telecom reforms of the past two years?

A: The first thing the market is waiting to see is what America Movil will do. Another pending issue is what will happen with Nextel, which AT&T has also bid for but has yet to close. Another important theme will be the tender of new public television channels. While public TV stations might have a limited lifespan ahead in more mature markets, in Mexico they are still important and the prospect of a third national network is still relevant. Another issue to consider is the impact of the reform for mobile virtual network operators.

Q: What will be the challenges for telecom operators competing under the new regulatory regime?

A: The first challenge, apart from the implementation of the reforms, is that there still is a preponderant player in the market. Also, it’s a challenge to have two new regulatory bodies with few precedents, few rules. There’s been enormous effort made to arrive here. The telecom market now requires a high level of sophistication from a regulatory and competition perspective.

“The telecom market now requires a high level of sophistication from a regulatory and competition perspective”

Q: What opportunities still remain in the telecom market and which companies are in the best position to take advantage of them?

A: Obviously under the new laws there will be opportunities. Despite the fact that there’s still a preponderant player, this is clearly a very interesting market. The penetration of smart phones is high and as broadband penetration increases, there’ll be more opportunities for additional service offerings.

 

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TTR Dealmaker Q&A – Richard Hall (Cravath, Swaine & Moore)

Richard-Hall

TTR Dealmaker Q&A

February, 2015

Cutrale-Safra Acquire Chiquita Brands International

USD 1.26bn

Richard Hall
Cravath, Swaine & Moore

On 6 January Cavendish Acquisition Corp, an investment vehicle formed by Brazil-based Cutrale and Safra Group closed the acquisition of Charlotte, North Carolina-based Chiquita Brands International (NYSE:CQB) in a deal worth USD 1.26bn, including USD 685.91m in equity and USD 582.59m in net debt. Cravath, Swaine & Moore partner Richard Hall advised the buyers on this historic deal, resulting in the delisting of one of the world’s largest banana producers.
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Q: At what stage was Cravath retained?

A: Cravath was first approached about this transaction on behalf of Cutrale-Safra in late July, 2014, referred by Michael Rubinoff who works as a full-time advisor to the Safra Group. I’d done a number of actual and potential transactions with him for Banco Santander in the 2009-2011 time frame, during the global financial crisis, in his prior life at Bank of America Merrill Lynch. Cravath had not previously done any work for the Safra Group or Cutrale.

Q: How did Cravath land the mandate?

A: From my perspective, I did not feel that we were in a process, or beauty contest of any kind. Once we cleared out conflicts we were retained immediately. It was late in their consideration to launch a bid. The way it was presented to me by Michael, they were inclined very favorably towards bidding and at this time had decided to retain financial and other advisors. They came to us and said, “we’ve decided we would like to buy this company, help us navigate the tactical and legal challenges that stand in our way of acquiring the company.”

Q: On what basis did Cutrale-Safra launch its bid?

A: Let me address that from three dimensions: First, from the perspective of the shareholders of Chiquita, we believed the Fyffes transaction undervalued Chiquita.

Second, we believed we were better owners than shareholders of Fyffes. That speaks to a view that is more strategic in nature in terms of the relative importance in the banana distribution chain of growers versus logistics versus marketing versus retailing. At Cutrale-Safra, they believed that the growers are the most important part and that logistics is the second-most important part. Fyffes broadly viewed marketing and logistics as more important than growing. For example, if you look at the percentage of Fyffes throughput that comes from Fyffes-owned or Fyffes-managed real estate, it’s much lower than for major competitors like Dole or Del Monte.

“At Cutrale-Safra, they believed that the growers are the most important part and that logistics is the second-most important part”

Fyffes has much more of a business that is a spot purchase from growers. Cutrale-Safra have a view of the industry that it’s more important for big players in the industry to have more ownership over the plantations. By and large, all the big players in the industry – they get the production either from plantations they own, plantations they have long-term contracts with, or plantations with spot or short-term contracts, re-pricing all the time to make money. If you own, you can make money a different way by running your plantations better. Fyffes sits in the camp that willl take a higher percentage of output from spot markets. Because of that disagreement, we thought we were a better owner, one that could provide more value in the long run to all the players in the banana distribution chain.

“We believe these businesses are better located in a private company or in a much larger company that has a portfolio of other related assets”

The third issue is that we believe pure-play banana companies are just not well valued in the marketplace, because the industry is very seasonal and very cyclical, it’s hard for the capital markets to value these businesses over time. We believe these businesses are better located in a private company or in a much larger company that has a portfolio of other related assets. From a capital markets perspective we’d be a better owner; we’d be able to manage the cycle. Cutrale-Safra, they’re private, and as a private company they’re able to ride out the cyclicality and seasonality of the business. From a capital markets perspective, Chiquita-Fyffes would have been a large, close to pure-play banana company.


Q: How did the debt on Chiquita’s books affect the buyers’ appetite for the deal?

A: They viewed it as undervalued regardless and they had lots of money. They will in the near term run the business less leveraged, mainly because they will be generating less free cash flow because they will be reinvesting more in growing.

Q: How close was the Fyffes-Chiquita deal to closing when Cutrale-Safra stepped in with a competing bid?

A: We announced our offer in the second week in August. Chiquita had already mailed out their proxy material for their meeting, so their meeting was originally scheduled for three weeks after our offer was submitted. This meeting was to be held for Chiquita shareholders to approve the Fyffes transaction.

Q: What made this transaction unique?

A: First, it is somewhat rare in the US for interlopers to jump agreed bids. Jumping a bid is itself somewhat rare. It is quite rare that in the context of a jumped bid, the bidder has to take it all the way to a proxy fight.

Certainly for a transaction of this size, it is extremely rare to have an interloper go all the way to a shareholder meeting and win the vote; and even more rare that, having taken it all the way to a proxy fight, the jumped bidder actually wins the proxy fight.

“It is extremely rare to have an interloper go all the way to a shareholder meeting and win the vote; and even more rare that, having taken it all the way to a proxy fight, the jumped bidder actually wins the proxy fight.”

A second very interesting feature was that it unfolded in such a short period of time. Normally proxy contests in the US are very slow and drawn out processes of months and months. A few people deserve thanks for that, but it was largely a function of the timetable set out in the proposed Chiquita-Fyffes transaction.

Q: What are the market implications of the deal?

A: The most significant market implication of this transaction gets back to strategic vision for the industry. Chiquita, under its new owners, will be looking to invest in and grow its existing plantations. This is likely to lead to more direct competition at the growing level alongside the other two big players which are focused on growing, Dole and Del Monte, at the expense of players like Fyffes, which are more focused on logistics. If Cutrale and Safra are correct, power will shift away from logistics-focused Fyffes, towards growers.

If Chiquita is successful in buying up more plantations, and entering into longer-term contracts with growers, it will put pressure on companies like Fyffes and will lead to growers being better off. Growers will be able to command better pricing, and will grow capacity, either by buying farms, buying established growers or entering into more long-term contracts. Brazil could be an opportunity; it’s wherever they can find the land.

Q: How will this transaction impact Chiquita operations, production and distribution?

A: In terms of the basic banana distribution chain, the Cutrale-Safra vision is to invest in the growing – in the farms. You can expect to see more capital expenditure, more firepower on long-term contracts for people on the ground managing the production.

There will be modest synergistic gains on the logistics side, combining the logistics, administrative costs and expertise; the nuts and bolts of how you manage ships, rather than the ships themselves. Cutrale has its own logistics business that is primarily focused on the transportation of oranges, from a variety of places, including Brazil. The actual ships that transport oranges and bananas are different, but the management is common to both.

Chiquita’s corporate headquarters will be scaled back, and with the de-listing there will no longer be a need for public reporting which will result in cost savings. Leaving aside the headquarters synergies, we weren’t anticipating great synergies.

The ultimate unknown here for Cutrale-Safra is, are they right that investing in the farms, in the growing, has a bigger payback than investing elsewhere?

Q: What practice areas at Cravath were instrumental in its work on behalf of the buyers?

A: The three big practice areas were the M&A, finance and tax. We did some amount of work on the executive compensation and benefits, and if necessary we had a litigation side ready.

Q: What opportunities does the transaction present for the growth of Chiquita and associated businesses?

A: With the private ownership and the capital available from Cutrale-Safra, there’s an opportunity for substantial investment on the grower side that Chiquita wouldn’t have made and Chiquita-Fyffes wouldn’t have made because of their different strategic vision.

“The contest in the medium term will play out between the two competing visions for the industry”

The contest in the medium term will play out between the two competing visions for the industry. Most of the production of bananas sits with independents, people who aren’t locked into long-term contracts. At the moment there’s a lot of opportunity for Fyffes to get hold of a lot of production.

Q: Will Fyffes look to another deal to lock in a significant chunk of production?

A: Based on public statements, we do not believe that Fyffes thinks they are on the wrong side of that strategic vision. If they do not change their mind, they remain comfortable with this approach to the market, they obtain most of their production on a short-term basis and they will continue to own a significantly lower percentage of their throughput than Chiquita, Dole or Del Monte.

 

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TTR Dealmaker Q&A – Carlos Mello (Lefosse Advogados)

TTR Dealmaker Q&A-Carlos Mello

TTR Dealmaker Q&A

January, 2015

Cielo forms JV with BB Elo

USD 4.48bn

Carlos Mello
Lefosse Advogados

Carlos Mello, partner at Lefosse Advogados, advised Cielo on its USD 4.48bn credit card issuing joint venture with Banco do Brasil subsidiary BB Elo Cartões e Participações, which closed on 19 November. A graduate of University of São Paulo with an LLM from Columbia University, Mello joined Lefosse in 2010. His practice focuses primarily on capital markets and M&A.
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Q: How did this JV originate and to what end?

A: Banco do Brasil has been increasingly doing this sort of partnership to have the ability to run companies more like private companies do. It’s what happened in insurance with Mapfre and with Votorantim in investment banking. As a state-held company, Banco do Brasil has very strict protocols when contracting services; it’s a complicated process and takes a long time. It’s very natural that it would look for this type of partnership in the credit card business as well. For BB Elo, it allows it to manage the issuing business in a more private-like environment, and for Cielo it adds a complementary line of business to its other services.

“For BB Elo, it allows it to manage the issuing business in a more private-like environment, and for Cielo it adds a complementary line of business”

Q: At what stage was Lefosse retained?

A: We first started working on the transaction in March, 2014. The negotiations kind of stopped in mid-May-June for commercial reasons, and resumed around November. A lot of the economic terms had been defined, they were pretty advanced prior to our involvement.

 

Q: Why was Lefosse selected for the mandate?

A: It’s a very strategic deal in a very particular industry; the credit card business is very complicated. There are not many lawyers with expertise in this segment – I happen to be one of them. I did the IPOs of all the credit card acquirers and was contacted directly; there was no beauty contest. I did Cielo’s joint venture with American Express; I did its IPO and bond issuance. These were two listed entities, this was right up my ally. We were co-counsel in the transaction alongside a team from Barbosa, Müssnich & Aragão led by Francisco Müssnich.

 

Q: What was unique about this transaction?

A: This was a deal that was made possible because of changes in the Brazilian industry with the implementation of new regulation. The credit card industry was unregulated until last year. The new regulation made the interconnections between the different actors more clear – it gave Banco do Brasil the framework to form this joint venture. It’s a highly new deal into a recently regulated industry.

 

Q: What brought about the new regulation?

A: The Central Bank wants to have supervisory authority over all the systems of payment. The credit card industry as an unregulated business is something they were looking into, to set the parameters, from a supervisory and financial health viewpoint. On doing that, they created the opportunity for certain banks like Banco do Brasil. The Central Bank had been reviewing, studying and analyzing the credit card industry for about 10 years. Credit card issuers will now be subject to similar oversight as banks, with minimal capital requirements, submission of monthly balance sheets to the Central Bank which may audit, request additional information or a capital increase. At the end of the day its better for the consumer and the merchants to be more secure and connected to the banking industry. It’s just a natural development following the Central Bank’s creation of the Brazilian Payment System over 10 years ago.

 

Q: What other transactions could this deal precipitate?

A: I think the expectation is that other banks will join this joint venture. It may be easier for banks to join the JV rather than pursue similar deals on their own, depending on the scale of the business. It could be onerous for each bank to maintain the complicated structure independently, depending on which cards they issue.

 

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